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I. Introduction
1. Limitation periods—or prescription—are a classic issue 
of private law, but may sometimes have been regarded as 
a quite dull subject,1 as a kind of Cinderella of the law. 
On closer inspection, it appears that such a view would 
be mistaken and would produce a false impression. In the 
law of limitation periods, diametrically opposed interests 
of the parties involved must be taken account of and 
weighted. On the one hand, there is, in the words of the 
great pandectist Bernhard  Windscheid taken up to the 
Motive (the travaux préparatoires or legislative materials) 
to the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
BGB), the “obfuscating power of time” (verdunkelnde 
Macht der Zeit).2 If  a long period of time has passed, 
it gets more and more difficult to establish and prove 
the facts. Legal peace (Rechtsfriede) must, someday, be 
1 In the same sense, R. Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations of  a European Law of  Set-Off  
and Prescription, 2002, 65.
2 B. Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, Band I, 9th edition by v. Kipp, 1906, § 105; 
Motive I 291.
established.3 On the other hand, a creditor should have 
a realistic chance to enforce his claim. In case his claim 
would be time-barred by the statute of limitations even 
before he became aware of his claim and had a realistic 
chance to pursue it, his claim would be deprived of 
substance and value and practically be taken away from 
him.4 In this field full of tension, legal rules on limitation 
periods mostly have to strike some compromise. In 
matters of competition law, also the public interest may be 
involved.5 And in practice, limitation has sometimes been 
invoked as a defence successfully in competition damages 
actions.6 Interestingly enough, a number of European 
legislators have, in relatively recent years, thoroughly 
reformed their laws on limitation periods, e.g., France in 
3 H.  Prütting, G.  Wegen and G.  Weinreich  (eds.) (-Deppenkemper), BGB, 12th 
edition  2017, §  194 no.  3; H.  Brox and W.-D.  Walker, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB, 39th 
edition 2015, no. 668.
4 Begr. des RegE, BT-Drs. 14/6040 S. 95, 96; vgl. dazu BGH, Urteil vom 20-04-1993 – X 
ZR 67/92. 
5 See A. Piekenbrock, Befristung, Verjährung, Verschweigung und Verwirkung, 2006, p. 317ff.
6 A specific problem is the intertemporal application of  the rule on suspension after 
a competition authority has taken action, see A.  Rinne and K.  Kolb, Die Verjährung 
kartellschadensersatzrechtlicher “Altansprüche” – Ein Überblick, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Kartellrecht, 2017, 217-223.
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AbstrAct
Limitation periods could imperil the enforcement of competition damage claims 
and in the footsteps of the Manfredi case of the ECJ artt. 10, 11 and 18 of the 
Damages Directive therefore give complex rules on this issue. France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have adapted their relevant 
legislations. The five years minimum limitation period is extended in Germany 
(five years plus rest of the year) and England (six years) and in some Member 
States there is discussion or case law on when in practice the period really 
starts to run, especially with a view to the question of publication of decisions 
of competition authorities. Absolute limitation periods, which are mentioned in 
Recital 36, is provided for in a number of Member States. Member State choices 
for suspension or interruption diverge. Sometimes, there are specific rules for 
limitation periods for claims for contribution against co-infringers. One may 
wonder whether some of these divergencies may lead to law and forumshopping.
Les délais de prescription pourraient compromettre la mise en œuvre 
des demandes d’indemnisation du fait des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. 
Par conséquent, les articles 10, 11 et 18 de la directive sur les actions 
en dommages et intérêts donnent, dans la lignée de l’arrêt Manfredi de la 
CJUE, des règles complexes sur cette question. La France, l’Allemagne, l’Italie, 
les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni ont adapté leur législation pertinente. Le délai de 
prescription de cinq ans au minimum est allongé en Allemagne (cinq ans plus 
la fin de l’année) et en Angleterre (six ans). Dans d’autres États membres, il y a 
un débat ou de la jurisprudence sur le point de savoir quand en pratique le délai 
de prescription commence réellement à courir, en particulier au regard de la 
question de la publication des décisions des autorités de concurrence. Les délais 
de prescription absolus mentionnés au considérant 36 sont prévus dans plusieurs 
États membres. Les choix des États membres divergent entre la suspension et 
l’interruption. Il y a parfois des règles spécifiques pour les délais de prescription 
concernant les demandes en contribution à l’encontre des coauteurs de 
l’infraction. On peut se demander si certaines de ces divergences peuvent mener 
à un forum shopping ou à un law shopping.
Limitation periods
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20087 and already in 2002 Germany.8 These reforms have 
also been in harmony with some academic proposals for 
uniform European or international rules on limitation 
periods.9 But above all, in the present context, there is 
the Manfredi-ruling of the ECJ. There, the ECJ found 
that national limitation periods for actions for damages 
because of infringements of the European competition 
rules have to observe the principles of equivalence 
and of effectiveness and may not render it practically 
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to 
seek compensation for the harm suffered.10 It thus seems 
logical that the Directive 2014/10411 expressly addresses 
the issue of limitation periods. This is done in Article 10 
Directive, which has got four paragraphs, and also in 
Article  11(4) (joint and several liability of immunity 
recipient) and Article 18 (consensual dispute resolution). 
Recital 36 gives explanations to Article 10 and Recital 49 
to Article 18. This already shows considerable complexity 
of the issue. To give at least an introductory overview, 
one might try to draw up a non-exhaustive, and yet 
too long list of issues which merit discussion when one 
does analyse the different implementing rules of the 
Member States. At the outset, it should be recalled that 
Article  10(1) Directive mandates the Member States 
to “lay down rules applicable to limitation periods for 
bringing actions for damages” ((1) sentence 1) and these 
shall “determine when the limitation period begins to run, 
the duration thereof and the circumstances under which it 
is interrupted or suspended” ((1) sentence 2).
1. Five years or more under 
the subjective system?
2. For the limitation period to begin to run, Article 10(2) 
Directive requires that the infringement have ceased and 
that the claimant have or ought to have knowledge. This 
is a subjective system, but Article 10(3) only prescribes 
a limitation period of “at least five years.” This is a 
minimum rule and Member States may adopt—and 
sometimes indeed adopt—longer limitation periods, e.g., 
in Germany (five years plus rest of year)12 or England (six 
years).13 Will this cause law and forum shopping?14
7 Loi no  2008-561 du 17  juin  2008 portant réforme de la prescription en matière civile. 
See, e.g., P. Ancel, Charakter, System und Fristen der Verjährung in Frankreich nach 
der Reform, in: O. Remien (ed.), Verjährungsrecht in Europa – zwischen Bewährung und 
Reform, Würzburger Tagung vom 8. und 9.5.2009, 2011, 29-44; for reports on many 
aspects of  this reform and on reform proposals in other European countries, see the 
conference volume edited by O. Remien, just cited in this note.
8 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, Vom 26. November 2001 (BGBl. I Seite 
3138).
9 Above all Principles of  European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Principles of  
International Commercial Contracts.
10 ECJ, judgment of  13. 7. 2006 – C-295/04 (Manfredi), No. 82, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.
11 Directive  2014/104/EU of  the European Parliament and the Council of  26  November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union.
12 See § 33h GWB.
13 See s. 18.
14 See W.  Wurmnest, Forum Shopping bei Kartellschadensersatzklagen und die 
Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2017, 2.
2. Absolute period?
3.  Recital  36, sentence  5, allows Member States “to 
maintain or introduce absolute limitation periods that are 
of general application, provided that the duration of such 
absolute limitation periods does not render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right 
to full compensation.” This is a faculty left to the Member 
States; the Directive does not prescribe having such an 
absolute period. Germany, e.g., has such a rule, or even 
two of them. Does this mean that German law will be 
disadvantageous for the claimant?
3. Effects of lapse 
of limitation period
4. The Directive gives rules on limitation periods, but does 
not say anything on their effects. Concepts, however, may 
differ. The effects of the lapse of the limitation period 
therefore also may be an issue, although arguably a more 
dogmatic than practical one.
4. Effects of action 
of competition authority
5.  In practice, follow-on actions are important and 
they are preceded by action having been taken by 
a competition authority. Article  10(4), sentence  1, 
Directive prescribes that if  a competition authority takes 
action, the limitation period is suspended or interrupted. 
The choice between suspension and interruption is 
expressly left to national law. The two concepts are not 
defined, but their existence is presupposed—suspension 
only stopping for some time the limitation period from 
running, whereas interruption takes away the part of the 
limitation period which already has lapsed and later leads 
to a new start of a fresh five years (or longer) limitation 
period to run. What are the choices which have been 
made by the national implementing legislators in this 
respect? At any rate, Article 10(4), sentence 2, adds that 
the “suspension shall end at the earliest one year after the 
infringement decision has become final or the proceedings 
are otherwise terminated.”
5. Limitation period for recovery 
of contribution by co-infringer 
(joint and several liability)
6. Article 11 Directive regulates joint and several liability 
and Article 11(5) Directive foresees that an infringer may 
recover a contribution from any other infringer. But what 
about the limitation period applicable to this claim for 
contribution of one infringer against his co-infringers? 
The solution is not necessarily evident, at least the 
German implementing legislator considered a specific 
rule to be necessary.15
15 § 33 h VII GWB n.F.; see further infra the German report. Ce
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6. Immunity recipients
7.  As far as joint and several liability is concerned, 
immunity recipients under Article 11(4) Directive enjoy 
some privilege—they are jointly and severally liable only 
to their direct or indirect purchasers or providers (lit. a) 
or “where full compensation” cannot be obtained (lit. b); 
subparagraph 2 of Article 11(4) says that any limitation 
period applicable shall be “reasonable and efficient, to 
allow injured parties to bring such actions.” How is this 
implemented?
7. Consensual dispute 
resolution
8. A consensual dispute resolution process according to 
Article  18(1) Directive suspends the limitation period. 
Here, interruption is not given as an alternative option 
to the Member States. One may ask whether a specific 
implementing rule is necessary or whether the general 
rules in periods of limitation can be applied and suffice.
8. Collective proceedings
9.  Directive  2014/10416 does not contain specific rules 
on collective proceedings. Nevertheless, when legislating 
on competition damages, Member States may wish to 
legislate on the effect of collective proceedings on the 
limitation period.
10.  The above list gives a number of issues on periods 
of limitation which possibly could even be extended. To 
analyse them in the light of the diverging implementing 
legislations of important Member States promises to be 
the most interesting and rewarding.
O. R.
II. France
11. Limitation periods must not be overlooked because 
they can be an obstacle to an increase in actions for 
compensation. Follow-on actions should not be impeded 
by a too large notion of the limitation period. That is the 
reason why Recital 36 invites Members States to ensure 
that limitations do not render practically impossible 
or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to full 
compensation. Limitations periods are referred to in 
two Articles of the EU Directive: mainly Article 10 and 
on a secondary basis Article 18. The provisions of these 
Articles needed some changes in French law, which have 
been implemented without difficulties. They did not 
really trigger much debates.
16 Above note 11.
1. General provisions about 
limitation periods
12. Article 10 of the EU Directive deals with three specific 
aspects of limitation periods: the duration; the beginning 
of these periods; and the circumstances under which they 
are interrupted or suspended. 
1.1 The duration of the limitation period
13. Article 10 invites Member States to ensure that the 
limitation period for bringing actions for damages is at 
least five years. According to the existing Article 2224 of 
the Civil Code, action suits shall lapse after a period of 
five years. The French government could have extended 
this period, but it clung to the period of five years fixed 
by Article 2224 of the Civil Code. It was not considered 
necessary to go beyond five years. Changes to facilitate 
claims for damages were finally concentrated on the 
beginning of the limitation period.
1.2 The beginning of the limitation 
period
14. According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, action 
suits shall lapse from the day on which the holder of the 
right became aware or should have been aware of the 
facts necessary to enable him or her to fully exercise the 
right. This approach is realistic.
15.  Article  10 of the EU Directive outlines the scope 
further in order to be even more pragmatic. The 
limitation period should not begin if  the claimant does 
not know or cannot reasonably be expected to know 
cumulative elements. Two main elements are mentioned: 
cessation of the anticompetitive practice; knowledge of 
some accurate information. Those pieces of information 
are: (a) the behaviour and the fact that constitute an 
infringement, (b) the facts that the infringement has 
caused harm to be suffered by the holder of the right, 
(c) the identity of the infringer. Article L. 482-1 of 
the Commercial Code faithfully reproduces the list of 
criteria laid down by Article 10 of the EU Directive. It 
even added a requirement: the victim must know acts and 
facts “imputed to a natural or legal person.”
16. This would mean in practice that national competition 
authorities and the Commission publish their decision or 
a press release containing all these details. The French 
Competition Authority has aligned its press releases with 
those of the EU Commission. Its practice is even better 
in that the French Authority publishes press releases and 
the decisions they referred to on the same day, whereas 
the EU Commission publishes its decision long after its 
press releases. By contrast, the Bundeskartellamt did not 
C
e 
do
cu
m
en
t e
st
 p
ro
té
gé
 a
u 
tit
re
 d
u 
dr
oi
t d
'a
ut
eu
r p
ar
 le
s 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
s 
en
 v
ig
ue
ur
 e
t l
e 
C
od
e 
de
 la
 p
ro
pr
ié
té
 in
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 d
u 
1e
r j
ui
lle
t 1
99
2.
 T
ou
te
 u
til
is
at
io
n 
no
n 
au
to
ris
ée
 c
on
st
itu
e 
un
e 
co
nt
re
fa
ço
n,
 d
él
it 
pé
na
le
m
en
t s
an
ct
io
nn
é 
ju
sq
u'
à 
3 
an
s 
d'
em
pr
is
on
ne
m
en
t e
t 3
00
 0
00
 €
 d
'a
m
en
de
 (a
rt
. 
L.
 3
35
-2
 C
PI
). 
L’
ut
ili
sa
tio
n 
pe
rs
on
ne
lle
 e
st
 s
tri
ct
em
en
t a
ut
or
is
ée
 d
an
s 
le
s 
lim
ite
s 
de
 l’
ar
tic
le
 L
. 1
22
 5
 C
PI
 e
t d
es
 m
es
ur
es
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 d
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
po
uv
an
t a
cc
om
pa
gn
er
 c
e 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
by
 c
op
yr
ig
ht
 la
w
s 
an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
op
yr
ig
ht
 tr
ea
tie
s.
 N
on
-a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
 a
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
is
he
r's
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 m
ay
 b
e 
pu
ni
sh
ed
 b
y 
up
 to
 3
 y
ea
rs
 im
pr
is
on
m
en
t a
nd
 u
p 
to
 a
 €
 3
00
 0
00
 fi
ne
 (A
rt
. L
. 3
35
-2
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
). 
Pe
rs
on
al
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t i
s 
au
th
or
is
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
lim
its
 o
f A
rt
. L
 1
22
-5
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 a
nd
 D
R
M
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
50 Concurrences N° 3-2017 I Conference I 5 May 2017, Würzburg
publish most of its decisions17. Bruno Lasserre, former 
president of the French Competition Authority, often 
regretted this lack of information regarding respect of 
the rule of law. We hope it will be quite different in the 
future thanks to the transposition of this Directive.
17. Moreover, Article L. 482-1 implements a subparagraph 
of Article 11(4) on joint and several liability: “Member 
States shall ensure that any limitation period applicable to 
cases under this paragraph is reasonable and sufficient to 
allow injured parties to bring such actions.” It is explained 
in the final report to the President of the Republic 
relative to the ordinance of 9 March 2017 transposing 
the EU Directive18. According to the French government, 
Article L. 482-1 must be applied in relation with Article 
L. 481-11 implementing Article 11 of the EU Directive 
on joint and several liability. The five-year period does 
not begin to run if  the injured party, who did not obtain 
compensation from jointly and severally liable debtors, 
brings an action against an immunity recipient. The 
French government chose to deal with all aspects of 
the beginning of limitation periods in the same Article 
L. 482-1.
1.3 Interruption or suspension 
of the limitation period
18.  Article  10(4) of the EU Directive requires that 
“Member  States shall ensure that a limitation period is 
suspended or, depending on national law, interrupted, 
if a competition authority takes action for the purpose 
of the investigation or its proceedings in respect of an 
infringement of competition law to which the action for 
damages relates.” It added that “the suspension shall end 
at the earliest one year after the infringement decision 
has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise 
terminated.” 
19. Article L. 462-7 is modified in the 4th subparagraph: 
any action taken by the Competition Authority, the EU 
Commission or another national competition authority 
to investigate, to find or to sanction an infringement 
interrupts the period of prescription. The French 
government further provides: effects of interruption 
shall go on until a decision is no longer subject to an 
ordinary review. The effect of an interruption offers more 
protection than a suspension. According to Article 2231 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, “interruption erases the 
delay that has elapsed and causes a new period of the 
same duration as the former period to run.” In contrast, 
suspension of the prescription only stops without erasing 
the delay that has already run, according to Article 2230. 
The French government chose interruption, which is the 
most convenient solution for the injured parties.
17 T.  Weck and P. Rummel,  Allemagne  : Le Gouvernement allemand adopte le Projet 
de loi relative à la modernisation de la Loi contre les restrictions à la concurrence 
(Projet de neuvième amendement de la Loi contre les restrictions à la concurrence), 
28 September 2016, Concurrences No. 1-2017, Article No. 83364, pp. 222-223.
18 Report to the President of  the Republic relative to ordinance No. 2017-303 of  9 March 
2017 on actions for damages for anticompetitive practices.
We can conclude that Article 10, paragraph 4, of the EU 
Directive has been faithfully implemented into French 
law.
2. Particular provisions about 
the suspensive effects of a 
consensual dispute resolution
20.  According to Recital  49, the objective is obviously 
not to discourage injured parties and infringers from 
choosing consensual dispute resolution. Recital  49 
explains that limitation periods for bringing actions for 
damages could prevent them from having sufficient time 
to come to an agreement on the compensation to be paid. 
That is why suspension seems to be necessary. 
21. Article 18, paragraph 1, deals with these suspensive 
effects: “Member  States shall ensure that the limitation 
period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for 
the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process.” 
It adds: “The suspension of the limitation period shall 
apply only with regard to those parties that are or that 
were involved or represented in the consensual dispute 
resolution.”
22.  The French government considered this provision 
was already implemented thanks to Article 2238 of the 
Civil Code, which provides: “Prescription is suspended 
from the day when, after a dispute arises, the parties 
agree to proceed to mediation or conciliation, or, if there 
is no written agreement, from the day of the first meeting 
of the mediation or conciliation.” The beginning of 
the suspension is clearly mentioned. The end of the 
suspension is as clear. Article 2238 of Code civil further 
specifies: “The prescriptive period begins to run again, 
for a duration that cannot be inferior to six months, from 
the date on which either one of the parties or both, or the 
mediator or the conciliator, declares that the mediation 
or conciliation has ended.” Suspension for the whole 
duration of a consensual process is ensured.
We can conclude that existing law in France was already 
complying with the requirements of the EU Directive.
C. P.
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III. Germany
23.  The German GWB (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbe-
schränkungen—Act against restraints of competition) 
in the new version enacted with the 9th reform act to it 
(9. GWB-Novelle) of June 1st, 2017 now has one quite 
long special provision on “Verjährung,” i.e., limitation of 
actions or prescription. It is § 33h GWB.19 This provision 
has no less than eight paragraphs. Article 10 Directive has 
got four paragraphs and even if  one adds Articles 11(4) 
and 18(1) Directive the German law has the tendency of 
being quite elaborate. A closer look may show the details.
1. Five years? 
24.  The five years rule of Article  10(3) Directive is 
followed in § 33h I. The German legislator sticks to the 
five-year minimum rule and has not opted for a higher 
number of years. As the ordinary prescription period 
in the BGB is three years only,20 this is probably not 
surprising. However, the number of years alone is not 
decisive!
2. Subjective system and 
end of the year: Five years 
plus rest of year!
25.  Really great importance must be attached to the 
question when the limitation period begins to run. 
Generally speaking, there are objective limitation periods 
and subjective limitation periods: Objective periods start 
with some kind of real event; subjective periods start 
only when the creditor has or ought to have knowledge 
of the event and/or of his claim.21 Article 10(2) Directive 
is quite clear in requiring that for the limitation period to 
begin to run the infringement must have ceased and the 
creditor must know or be expected to know of behaviour, 
infringement (lit.  a first and second alternative), harm 
(lit.  b) and identity (lit.  c). This is a subjective system. 
And it is in conformity with current general German law 
of limitation periods.22 § 33h II does not closely follow 
the wording of Article 10(2) Directive, but rather reverses 
the order of the different elements; however, this does not 
seem to be a deviation in substance.
19 Neuntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrännkungen 
vom 1. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I S. 1416); bevore see the draft bill in: BT-Drs. 18/10207 
(Gesetzentwurf  der Bundesregierung Entwurf  eines Neunten Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), modified by BT-Drs. 18/11446 (8.3.2017) 
and see Bundesrat Drucksache 207/17 (10.3.2017).
20 Cf. § 195 BGB.
21 D. Looschelders, Verjährungsbeginn und -frist im subjektiv-objektiven System sowie die 
Wirkung von Treu und Glauben, in: O. Remien (ed.) Verjährungsrecht in Europa – zwischen 
Bewährung und Reform, Würzburger Tagung vom 8. und 9.5.2001, 181-198, 181. See also 
R. Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations of  a European Law of  Set-Off  and Prescription, 
2002, 96ff. 
22 A.  Fritzsche, C.  Klöppner and M.  Schmidt, Die Praxis der privaten 
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung in Deutschland, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2016, 501, 
501-502.
26. Though, in one respect there is an important German 
speciality in § 33h II: The limitation period according 
to § 33h only starts to run “mit dem Schluss des Jahres” 
(with the end of the year) in which all the requirements 
have been met. Thus, if  today on May 5th, 2017 all 
requirements are met, the limitation period nevertheless 
only starts to run with the end of the current year, i.e. 
December 31, 2017! This is the classic German system 
of end-of-the-year-, Sylvester or ultimo-prescription! 
It is nowadays the ordinary prescription system in 
Germany.23 In a general comparative perspective, this is 
interesting, but often not followed in other countries.24 
The effect is that the limitation period is not really five 
years, but a bit longer: five years plus rest of the current 
year! Only in case all prerequisites are met on December 
31st, the period will be just clear five years. If  everything 
gets known to your client on January 1st, it is five years 
plus 364 days! This is in conformity with Article  10(3) 
Directive: “at least five years.” Interestingly enough, 
the reasons for the draft bill do not refer to the general 
German system of end-of-the-year prescription, but 
say that in practice it will be hardly possible to exactly 
determine in time when the preconditions for the start 
of the running of the limitation period under § 33h II, 
respectively Article  11(2) Directive, have been met.25 
Whether before or after the beginning of New Year’s Day 
in the eyes of the German legislator is easier to determine 
and less often relevant. When, e.g., a claim is started on 
some July 1st it does not matter whether it has been late 
in June or early in July of five years ago that the claimant 
got knowledge, it suffices that it has not been earlier than 
before the start of that year five years ago. In practice, 
German law thus should be more creditor-friendly 
than many other European Member State laws: not five 
years sharp, but five years plus rest of year! Welcome to 
German law to those who are just a bit late? But please, 
not too much. And: England and Wales have six years 
(but not Scotland…).26
3. Objective period 
of limitation: Ten years
27.  Subjective systems of periods of limitation mostly 
have a relatively short subjective period of limitation 
going together with a long objective period,27 although 
the “long-stop” is for specific cases sometimes deliberately 
left out.28 Article  10 Directive does not contain such a 
23 D. Looschelders, Ibid. 189f.; BeckOK BGB/Henrich/Spindler, 42. Ed. 1.2.2017, BGB § 
199 no. 3. See also O. Remien, Schlusswort: Übereinstimmungen und Unterschiede in den 
Kernfragen der Verjährung in der europäischen Privatrechtsentwicklung, in: O. Remien 
(ed.), Verjährungsrecht in Europa zwischen Bewährung und Reform, Würzburger Tagung 
vom 8. und 9.5.2009, 2011, 337-402, 393.
24 O.  Remien, Schlusswort: Übereinstimmungen und Unterschiede in den Kernfragen 
der Verjährung in der europäischen Privatrechtsentwicklung, in: O.  Remien (ed.), 
Verjährungsrecht in Europa (above note 23) 377, 393.
25 BT-Drs. 18/10207 S. 66 zu Abs. 2.
26 See s. 18.
27 R. Zimmermann (above note 21) 99ff.; O. Remien (above note 23) 385f.
28 See O. Remien, ibid. 391f. on personal injury cases in France and the Netherlands as well 
as in a British draft and, discussing the problem of  cases of  sexual abuse. Ce
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rule, but Recital  36, sentence  5, permits application 
of “absolute limitation,” provided it does not make it 
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to 
full compensation.29 The German long-stop period starts 
to run when the claim has accrued (§ 33h III No. 1) and 
the infringement has ceased (§ 33h III No.  2). In case 
the infringement continues and the ten-year-limit of § 
33h III applies, German law may be quite unfavourable 
to somebody who acquires knowledge only very late, 
say after nine years: only one year is left for taking 
action. Other EU Member States laws seem to be more 
favourable: Plaintiff, beware of German law?
28.  Where the victim learns of the infringement only 
after more than ten years, one might wonder whether the 
complete cut-off  by § 33h III is really compatible with 
Recital  36 and the ruling in Manfredi.30 If  these latter 
are taken literally, probably not… But this is doubtful. 
If  such a case should arise in practice, a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ may be appropriate.
4. Further objective long-stop: 
Thirty years
29.  A further objective long-stop is provided for in § 
33h IV: Thirty years after the infringement. This runs 
independent of harm and ceasing of the infringement. 
Probably, it will be rather exceptional that this rule will 
be invoked and it may be more by precaution that the 
German legislator provided for this contingency. The 
thirty-year period conforms to the general rule in § 199 
III 1 No. 2 BGB.
5. Prescription taking effect
30.  Not much novelty is contained in § 33h V: 
Prescription takes effect when the five, ten or thirty-year 
period of limitation of paragraphs  1, 3 or 4 of § 33h 
have lapsed. This may be rather evident, save exceptions 
in paragraph  8. What is meant by prescription here is 
presupposed and is regulated in the general provisions of 
the BGB: no extinction of the obligation, but a right to 
refuse to perform if  the defence of limitation is invoked.
6. Effect of taking action 
of competition authority
31.  Article  10(4), sentence  1, Directive provides that 
if  a competition authority takes action the period 
of limitation shall be suspended or interrupted. In a 
quite similar vein, as of July 1, 2005, in Germany the 
then newly introduced §  33 V GWB had provided for 
suspension and it continues to give rise to disputes about 
29 Directive  2014/104/EU of  the European Parliament and the Council of  26  November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union, 
Recital 36.
30 ECJ, judgment of  13. 7. 2006 – C-295/04 (Manfredi).
its intertemporal applicability.31 §  33 V GWB of 2005 
provided for suspension when the competition authority 
“initiates a procedure” and thus was somewhat narrower 
than Article 10(4), sentence 1, Directive; whereas the bill 
for the 9th GWB-Novelle stuck to the old wording, in 
the course of the legislative procedure now the broader 
formulation of the Directive has been followed.32 But as 
already in 2005 also now, § 33h VI chooses suspension, 
not interruption. The British rule (s. 21) seems to be 
similar. Sentence 2 of § 33h VI takes up Article 10(4) 4. 
By choosing interruption, i.e., a new start of a five-year 
period, French law is even more generous to the plaintiff. 
But is this really necessary if  the competition authority 
has already decided?
7. Joint and several liability, 
and recovery of contribution 
from co-infringer
32.  Article  11 Directive provides for joint and several 
liability and Article  11(5) speaks of the recovery of a 
contribution from co-infringer(s). But what about the 
period of limitation applicable to the paying infringer’s 
claim for contribution against the co-infringer? In case 
the infringer pays at the end of the five-year period, will 
his claim for contribution against the other infringers be 
time-barred after a couple of days already? §  33  h  VII 
GWB expressly provides that the period of limitation 
for the claim for contribution only starts to run at 
the time of payment of damages to the victim. Here, 
German law protects the joint cartel tortfeasor’s claim for 
contribution. This is remarkable, because it is a deviation 
from general German civil law on limitation periods and 
joint and several liability.33
33. The Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal Court of Justice) 
has, a number of years ago, held that the claim for 
contribution accrues already when the joint and several 
liability arises, thus, in principle, with the infringements 
or their effects. This leads to harmonisation of the 
limitation period for the original claim for damages for 
the victim, which by way of cessio legis or subrogation 
has passed to the infringer who has paid damages (§ 426 
II BGB), and the independent claim for contribution 
which is a consequence of the joint and several liability 
31 Cf. inter alia OLG Jena 22.2.2017 – 2 U 583/15, BeckRS 2017, 103209; OLG Düsseldorf  
29.1.2014 – VU-U (Kart) 7/13 BeckRS  2014, 17537; 14.2.2015 – VI-U (Kart) 3/14, 
NJW  2015, 2129; LG Berlin 16.2.2014 – 16 O 384/13 Kart, BeckRS 205, 08972; 
contra: OLG Karlsruhe 9.11.2016 – 6 U 204/15 Kart; LG Mannheim 24.1.2017 – 2 O 
195/15, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht 2017/137; see also F. Bien and J. D. Harke, Neues 
Recht für alte Fälle? Der intertemporale Anwendungsbereich der Verjährungshemmung 
gemäß § 33 Abs. 5 GWB 2005, Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, 2013, 312, 344. For a 
recent survey see A. Rinne and K. Kolb, Die Verjährung kartellschadensersatzrechtlicher 
“Altansprüche” – Ein Überblick, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2017, 217; 
J. Scherzinger, Hat der Gesetzgeber aus den Fehlern bei der 7. GWB-Novelle gelernt? – 
Zu den Übergangsvorschriften im Regierungsentwurf  für eine 9. GWB-Novelle, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 2016, 513, especially 515f.
32 See BT-Drs. 18/11446 p. 7 (sub bb)) and the explanation p. 29, which also refers to the 
differences in the procedures in the particular legal systems of  the EU. The explanation 
calls this a “clarification” (“wird klargestellt”).
33 BGH  18. 6. 2009 – VII ZR  167/08, BGHZ  181, 310; slightly critical P.  Bydlinski, 
Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 7th edition 2016, § 426 Rn. 25. Ce
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(§ 426 I BGB). But it is disadvantageous for the jointly 
and severally liable person who has paid, here the paying 
co-infringer. § 33h VII GWB departs from this general 
rule or, at least, the view of the BGH.34 This shall protect 
the jointly and severally liable co-infringer who has paid 
damages.35 
8. Immunity recipients and 
SMEs
34.  Immunity recipients and SMEs under the Directive 
enjoy certain privileges, provided the injured party could 
obtain complete redress from the other tortfeasors. That 
this proves to be the case may become clear only after 
years. Article  11(4), subparagraph  2, therefore calls 
for reasonable limitation periods for the claim against 
the immunity recipient. In Germany, § 33h VIII GWB 
provides that for the claim against the immunity recipient 
or SME the period of limitation starts to run only as 
from the end of the year in which the injured party could 
not obtain complete redress from the immunity recipient 
respectively the SME. This then brings another five years 
plus. One may wonder whether this is really necessary 
or whether a suspension as in the case of action of a 
competition authority would have been sufficient.
9. Consensual dispute 
resolution
35. Article 12 Directive specifically mentions suspension 
during consensual dispute resolution. The GWB-Novelle 
does not take this up. Indeed, the BGB in §  204 No. 4 
BGB already has a general norm on suspension if  the 
case is submitted to a dispute resolution body and § 203 
BGB even provides for suspension during negotiations 
between debtor and creditor.36 Therefore, a specific 
cartel damages rule such as s. 22 of the British statutory 
instrument in Germany for this issue is not needed.
10. Collective proceedings
36. As German law is rather reluctant towards collective 
proceedings for damages and also the GWB does not 
bring specific rules in this respect, the question of the 
effect of collective proceedings on damages claims does 
not really arise. Something like s. 23 British statutory 
instrument therefore will be looked for in vain in the 
reformed GWB.
37.  To sum up, one might say on the German 
implementing legislation:
34 BGH, 18. 6. 2009 – VII ZR  167/08 BGB, previous footnote; contra F.  Peters, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Baurecht und Vergaberecht, 2007, 337 (341).
35 See the explanation in BT-Drs. 18/10207 p. 67.
36 Cf. H. Prütting, G. Wegen and G. Weinreich (-Deppenkemper), BGB, 12th edition 2017, 
§ 204 no. 11.
– Five years plus rest of the year seem to be quite 
friendly to the claimant;
– But the ten and thirty years objective absolute 
periods put clear limits in order to restore legal 
peace (Rechtsfriede);
– Suspension is preferred over interruption;
–  The claim for recovery of contribution is 
specifically protected by German law. According 
to the mandate of the Directive, the same applies 
in case of immunity recipients and SMEs.
O. R.
IV. Italy
38. Article 10 of the Directive aims to prevent that the 
statute of limitations could possibly unduly hamper the 
bringing of actions for damages.37 It can be said that, 
all in all, Article 8 of the Legislative Decree No. 3/2017 
faithfully transposes the Directive. The task has not 
been a hard one for the lawmaker, since Article 10 of the 
Directive does not imply major changes in the national 
system, except for the suspension of the limitation periods 
pending the administrative proceedings. In order to shed 
some light on the effects of the implementation, I will in 
the first instance shortly describe the current situation. 
In the absence of statutory provision specifically dealing 
with the issue, according to dominant case law, the period 
of limitation for bringing damages actions for breach 
of competition law is governed by Article  2947 of the 
Civil Code (c.c.), relating to tort liability, and it amounts 
therefore to five years. With regard to the question of 
when the period of limitation starts to run, the Italian 
Corte  di cassazione has ruled that, since harm caused 
by competition law infringement is not immediately 
apparent (so-called “hidden damages”), Article 2947 c.c 
has to be construed in the light of the general principle 
of law, according to which the period starts to run 
only “from the day on which the right can be enforced” 
(Article  2935  c.c.). As a consequence, the limitation 
period only starts to run when the victim has or ought 
to have had knowledge of all the essential elements of 
the tort; courts shall determine the starting point of the 
limitation period case by case, taking into consideration 
all the circumstances of the case.38 This principle of law 
applies both to follow-on and to stand-alone actions. 
In follow-on actions, courts tend to find that the 
starting point for limitation is the publication of CA’s 
infringement decision, regardless of its finality.39 Yet, this 
is not an uncompromising rule. The publication of the 
decision simply gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of 
awareness, on the part of the potential claimant, of the 
essential elements of the tort. The claimant can bring 
evidence of delayed knowledge, not attributable to his 
37 ECJ, Case C-295/04, Manfredi.
38 Leading case: Cassazione civ., 2.2.2007, No. 2305. 
39 Cassazione civ., 6.12.2011, No. 26188. Ce
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or her negligence; the defendant, who has the burden 
of proof with regard to limitation, can bring evidence 
of prior knowledge. As a matter of fact, in the series of 
cases relating to the so-called “Car Insurance cartel,”40 
where consumers acted as claimants, courts have up to 
now invariably applied the presumption that the injured 
party becomes aware of tort and damages not before the 
publication of the CA’s infringement decision.41 Instead, 
in cases concerning abuse of dominant position, when 
the plaintiff  claiming damages is an undertaking active 
in the same market, where the defendant is active, or in 
close connected markets, district courts usually take into 
account the claimant’s special experience and knowledge 
of the market. As a result, in such cases, the limitation 
period can start earlier than the publication of the ICA’s 
infringement decision: depending on the circumstances 
of the case, from ICA’s formal decision to commence 
proceedings or even earlier.42 Unfortunately, case law 
gives no guidance at all for stand-alone actions.
39. Article 10.3 of the Directive requires Member States 
to ensure/guarantee that the time limit for bringing 
actions for damages is at least five years. Although 
there is nothing in the Directive to prevent Member 
States from keeping or introducing more generous 
national provisions, Article  8.1 of the Decree provides 
that the limitation period for bringing actions for 
damages is precisely five years. The provision is, to that 
extent, basically consistent with current case law. It is 
noteworthy, though, that Article 8.1 bears an impact on 
the dispute, which is still alive not only among scholars, 
as to whether the infringement of competition laws 
gives rise to damages in tort or in contract.43 According 
to the Report, Article  8.1 clarifies once and for all the 
tortious nature of antitrust damages, thus confirming 
the prevailing opinion.44 From a different perspective, 
though, the dispute on characterisation now appears to be 
immaterial, at least with regard to limitation periods. In 
this light, Article 8.1 seemingly implies that every attempt 
to argue the applicability of the more generous standard 
deriving from Article 2946 c.c. (general limitation period 
of ten years) is now destined to fail.45 
With regard to the starting point of limitation, Article 8.2 
copies out Article 10.1 of the Directive.46 The case-by-
40 Follow-on damages actions based on ICA’s decision No. 8546/2000, finding that a number 
of  insurance companies conspired, by means of  exchanging confidential information, to 
inflate insurance prices in the compulsory motor-vehicle liability insurance market.
41 Cassazione civ., 28.11.2013, No. 26685.
42 Tribunale Roma, 23.11.2016, Fastweb-Wind; Tribunale Milano, 26.5.2016, CISMAT-SEA.
43 Cassazione civile, 3.3.2013, No. 8110, casting doubts on the dominant characterisation as 
liability in tort.
44 See also: Caiazzo, Italian Antitrust Review, 2/2016,114; Mingione, Corriere Giuridico, 
3/2017, 384.
45 At a closer look, the question arises of  whether Article 8 still allows the claimant to act 
“at the same time or alternatively under a contract,” when there is a contractual relationship 
between the parties (see: Caiazzo, 114). 
46 Accordingly, limitation period begins only after the conduct has ceased. This is basically 
consistent with previous case law (Mingione, 385), though it has been noticed that it 
could indirectly interfere with settled case law relating to the calculation of  the period 
of  limitation in case of  continuing or repeated infringements (see: Tavassi, 2016, 71; 
Scoccini, Giurisprudenza italiana, 12/2015, 2603).
case assessment of the starting point of limitation period 
based on subjective standards is nothing new, since 
national case law already requires that the victim of the 
tort has knowledge of all the elements necessary to file 
the claim (behaviour, illegality thereof, harm, causal 
link, identity of the infringer).47 Being so, it is likely 
that previous case law will be confirmed. The rule, in 
follow-on litigation, will continue to be the same as now: 
the publication of the infringement decision gives rise to 
a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of the essential 
elements of the tort. 
40.  Italian law provides for both interruption and 
suspension of limitation periods (Articles  2943, 
2941  c.c.). Moreover, when the claimant starts judicial 
proceedings in order to enforce a civil right, the 
limitation period is both interrupted and “suspended” in 
the broad sense (Article 2945 c.c.), meaning that the time 
does not run until the judgment becomes final. Nothing 
similar used to apply to administrative proceedings 
before the Competition Authority. This discrimination 
was not perceived as problematic, due to the fact that, 
according to the prevailing case law, the starting point 
of the limitation period was the publication of the ICA’s 
infringement decision and, even when the limitation 
period had already started to run before, Article 2943 c.c. 
allowed the creditor to interrupt it by filing a written 
request for payment. Fully complying with the Directive, 
Article 8.2 provides for a new case of suspension: even 
when the period of limitation had already begun to 
run before, it is suspended pending the administrative 
proceedings before the CA and until twelve months 
after the administrative decision has become final or 
the proceedings are otherwise terminated, i.e., without 
finding an infringement.48 This is a radical change in the 
national system. When the CA takes action, it is therefore 
less important to establish when exactly the victim had or 
ought to have had knowledge of the tort: in any event, 
the victim has a time limit of at least twelve months after 
the CA’s decision has become final. Furthermore, while 
it was previously undisputed that the limitation period 
continues to run pending an ongoing appeal against 
the CA’s decision, things are now different. Pursuant 
to Article 8.2, the period of limitation is suspended not 
only pending the CA’s investigation, but also pending 
judicial review proceedings.49 Since ICA’s decisions are 
almost always challenged and judicial proceedings before 
administrative courts are not always fast, the system is 
likely to lead to extremely long limitation periods.50 
41. The new regime is consistent with the increased value 
of ICA’s decisions and it appears to align with the overall 
objective of the Directive, i.e., the enhancement of 
47 The usual standard of  “knowledge by using ordinary diligence” can be deemed to be 
equivalent to the “reasonable presumption of  knowledge” in Article 10 of  the Directive. Cf. 
Granieri, AIDA, 1/2015, 90, commenting on the Directive.
48 On the question of  whether suspension starts only with the formal commencement 
of  investigation, published in the ICA’s Bulletin, or even with the prior “informal 
investigation,” see: Granieri, 94.
49 Granieri, 96; Scoccini, 2604.
50 Caiazzo,115; cf. Mingione, 386. Ce
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private enforcement. Nevertheless, scholars commenting 
on the Directive have criticised the suspension of 
limitation, on account of its inconsistency with the—up 
to now undisputed—basic autonomy of civil proceedings 
and administrative proceedings.51 It has to be borne in 
mind, though, that Article  8.2 does not imply that the 
existence of a prior CA’s decision finding an infringement 
is now a condition precedent to bringing an action for 
damages. Article  8.2 simply attaches importance to 
factual difficulties that the claimants usually face in 
gathering information necessary to substantiate the 
claim. Theoretically, nothing prevents the victim from 
bringing a civil action before the CA issues a decision. 
As a matter of fact, though, everything now encourages 
the victim to wait. Taken together, the new provisions on 
the binding effect and on the statute of limitations have 
the practical effect of preventing parallel proceedings 
before civil courts and before the CAs. The Decree clearly 
aims to give precedence to administrative proceedings. 
This can also be inferred from Article 4.8 of the Decree. 
Indeed, the latter goes beyond the Directive and allows 
the staying of civil proceedings pending investigations, 
with reference to the same infringement, before the CA.52
42. The Directive contains two other provisions concerning 
the statute of limitations: Article 11.4, dealing with joint 
and several liability of co-infringers; Article 18.1, relating 
to ADR proceedings. Article 11.4 of the Directive aims 
to harmonise the right to claim full compensation with 
the special position granted to immunity recipients and 
SMEs. Accordingly, Article  9.4 of the Decree sets out 
that, when the injured party seeks compensation from 
the immunity recipient on a joint and several basis, since 
full compensation cannot be obtained from the other 
undertakings, the period of limitation for bringing such 
actions starts to run only “when it is established” (risulta 
accertato) that the condition precedent for bringing such 
actions has come to existence. The national provision 
applies the rationale behind Article  2935  c.c., but it is 
not clear how and when precisely the impossibility of 
recovering compensation from other co-infringers can be 
deemed to be “established.”53 
43. With regard to ADR proceedings, Article 18.1 of the 
Directive mandates that the limitation period for bringing 
an action for damages is suspended for the duration of 
any consensual dispute resolution process. Article  15.1 
of the Decree simply makes reference to pre-existing 
national provisions governing the effect on the limitation 
period of the commencement of some ADR proceedings. 
All of these provisions set out a rule according to which 
the commencement of ADR proceedings both interrupts 
the period and “suspends” it for the entire duration of the 
51 Tavassi, 71. See Cass. civ. No. 2305/2007, reaffirming the autonomy of  judicial 
proceedings from the pre-existence of  a CA’s decision.
52 The question of  whether civil courts had or not the power to stay, pending the national 
CA’s investigation or the appeal against the decision, has been up to now highly 
controversial, outside the limited scope of  Article 140 bis D. lgs. No. 205/2005 (which 
allows courts to stay the proceedings at the stage of  the decision on the admissibility of  
the consumers’ “class action”) and of  Article 16 EU Regulation 1/2003 (see Negri, 2012, 
427). 
53 Caiazzo, 116.
proceedings.54 Article 15.1 does not mention the ordinary 
out-of-court negotiations. If  none of the aforementioned 
provisions could apply by analogy, general rules will 
apply: under Article  2943  c.c., the service of a written 
request for payment interrupts the limitation period 
that starts afresh. This would not presumably be fully in 
line with the Directive, though the practical outcome is 
perhaps even more favourable to the injured party. 
M. N.
V. Netherlands
44.  Article 6:193s Civil Code introduces two limitation 
periods for claims for the compensation of damages as a 
result of an infringement of competition law: one shorter 
period of five years (also called a “relative” or subjective 
period”) 55 and a longer period of twenty years (also 
called an “absolute or objective period”).56 The short 
period of five years starts to run on the day subsequent 
to the day on which the infringement ceased and the 
harmed party knows or reasonably should know of the 
infringement, the damage suffered as a result and the 
identity of the person that is liable for the damage. This 
part of Article 6:193s Civil Code implements Article 10, 
paragraph 2, Directive. The drafting of it may give rise to 
a misunderstanding. Article  10, paragraph  2, Directive 
requires knowledge of the “behaviour” and the “fact that 
it constitutes an infringement of competition law.” The 
Directive, therefore, seems to make a distinction between 
the factual behaviour (the acts of the infringer) and its 
legal qualification as an infringement of competition law. 
It requires that the harmed party have knowledge of both 
for the statute of limitations to start to run. That is alien 
to the Dutch rules on statutes of limitation. Knowledge 
or awareness of the legal qualification of the facts that 
gave rise to the damage is not required for a subjective 
statute of limitations to run.57 Against this backdrop, one 
might read “infringement” in Article 6:193s Civil Code 
as to mean that the harmed party should have knowledge 
only of the facts that constitute the infringement (or are 
sufficient to constitute an infringement of competition 
law). However, Article 6:193s Civil Code purports 
to implement the Directive loyally.58 “Infringement,” 
therefore, captures both the “behaviour” and “the fact 
that it constitutes an infringement of competition law.” 
In practice, this will, of course, usually go hand in hand, 
54 Articles 2943.4 and 2945.4 c.c., concerning arbitration; Article 5.6 D. lgs. No. 28/2010, 
concerning mediation; Article 2 and Article 8 d.l. No. 132/2014, concerning negotiation 
proceedings, when the lawyers have entered into a so-called “negotiation convention”; 
Article 141-quinquies D. lgs. No. 206/2005, concerning ADR proceedings for consumers. 
It is arguable that Article 2945 c.c. and the “suspension” of  limitations do not apply to 
the “arbitrato irrituale” (so-called “contractual arbitration,” Article 808 ter Code of  Civil 
Procedure). 
55 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19.
56 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19. 
57 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court, 26 November 2004, NJ 2006/115 (Bosman / Mr. G.) and Dutch 
Supreme Court; 5 January 2007, NJ 2007/320 (De Bijenkorf  / X).
58 Cf. Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19. Ce
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especially in follow-on litigation. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. One can think, for example, of a 
complaint filed by the harmed party with the competition 
authorities. In that case, the harmed part may be aware 
of the behaviour, but may not know yet whether it 
constitutes an infringement of competition law. The 
District Court in Rotterdam found that, prior to the 
introduction of Article 6:193s Civil Code, the filing of 
a complaint and knowledge of damage was sufficient to 
start the subjective statute of limitations of Article 3:310, 
paragraph 1, Civil Code (pursuant to which the statute 
of limitations of five years starts on the day subsequent 
to the day on which the harmed party gets subjective 
knowledge of the damage and the person liable for it).59 
A problem with the approach of the Directive may be 
that it introduces a differentiation for the starting point 
of the statute of limitations, based on the legal knowledge 
of the harmed party. Given a certain behaviour on the 
market, a multinational with a large competition law 
department may have the knowledge that the behaviour 
constitutes an infringement of competition law sooner 
than an SME without a legal department. This is even 
more true where Article 6:193s Civil Code (and Article 10, 
paragraph 2, Directive) introduces a certain objectivation 
of knowledge (“should have known”).
45. In addition to the subjective term of five years, Article 
6:193s Civil Code also provides for an objective term of 
twenty years. This term starts to run on the day following 
the day the infringement ceases. The Directive allows the 
introduction of absolute limitation periods, “provided 
that the duration of such absolute limitation periods does 
not render practically impossible of excessively difficult the 
exercise of the right to full compensation.”60 The Dutch 
twenty-year term seems compliant with that provision, 
in particular because it only starts to run once the 
infringement has ceased.
46. Dutch law makes a distinction between interruption 
and extension of limitation periods. A bit counter-
intuitively, interruption has the effect that a new statute 
of limitations starts to run. Interruption requires an act 
of one of the parties, such as the sending of a demand 
letter. Extensions work de lege. Dutch law does not 
have the concept of suspension of limitation periods.61 
Extension has, however, the same effect as suspension, 
because the extension extends or lengthens the limitation 
period with the duration of the period during which there 
were grounds for extension (or suspension). So, the clock 
is not stopped during the period in which that ground 
arises, but is allowed to run for a longer period. The net 
effect is the same. In order to be consistent with our laws, 
the legislator has opted to use extension in all instances 
where the Directive applies suspension.62
47. Article 6:193t, paragraph 1, Civil Code provides for 
59 District Court Rotterdam, 7 March 2007, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2007:BA0926.
60 Recital 36 Directive.
61 Cf. Art.10, para. 4, and 18, para. 1, Directive.
62 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 20.
an extension during extrajudicial dispute resolution.63 
This provision applies to all forms of ADR, not only 
mediation, including arbitration.64 It seems, however, 
doubtful that arbitration is captured by this provision 
(and by Article  18, paragraph  1, Directive for that 
matter). The Directive requires a suspension in case of 
consensual dispute resolution.65 The reason for this 
suspension is to afford the parties a “genuine opportunity 
to engage in consensual dispute resolution before bringing 
proceedings before national courts.”66 This does not 
suggest that arbitration is meant to be included here. This 
is reinforced by the link that is made between “consensual 
settlements” and “consensual dispute resolution.”67 Also, 
at least under Dutch law, there is no need for an extension 
in case of arbitration. Article 3:316 Civil Code already 
interrupts the statute of limitations in case of arbitration.
48. What possibly militates against this line of reasoning 
is that Article  18, paragraph  2, Directive provides that 
the court may suspend the proceedings for up to two 
years to make way for consensual dispute resolution, “[w]
ithout prejudice to provisions in national law in matters of 
arbitration.” 
49. However, an arbitration agreement, if  invoked before 
the court, generally leads to a lack of jurisdiction of the 
courts, at least if  done before any other defences were 
raised.68 In that case, a suspension of the proceedings 
makes no sense. So, at least under Dutch law, a suspension 
of the proceedings to make way for arbitration would 
only occur if  the parties agree to arbitration pending 
litigation before the courts. That is slightly at odds with 
the notion that limitation periods must be suspended 
(or extended) for the duration of the consensual dispute 
resolution process to offer them a genuine opportunity 
to engage in it before they bring the matter to court.69 
When considering the possibility of an extension of 
the proceedings, the courts must take into account the 
advantages of an expeditious procedure.70 It can hardly be 
maintained that opting for arbitration pending litigation 
will usually result in an expeditious procedure. Therefore, 
on balance, I do not think that arbitration should lead to 
an extension of the statute of limitations (other than the 
interruption under Article 3:316 Civil Code, which makes 
the extension superfluous in any case).
50.  Article 6:139t, paragraph  1, Civil Code also 
determines the end of a mediation. A mediation is ended 
if  one of the parties or the mediator advises the other 
party that the mediation ends (if  the mediator does it, 
presumably both parties should be advised).
63 It implements Art. 18, para. 1, Directive.
64 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 20.
65 Art. 18, para. 1, Directive.
66 Recital 49 Directive
67 Recital 51 Directive.
68 Art. 1022 and 1074 Code of  Civil Procedure; Art. II, para. 3, New York Convention 1958.
69 Recital 49 Directive.
70 Recital 50 Directive. Ce
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51. Article 6:193t, paragraph 2, Civil Code provides that 
an act of a competition authority in the context of an 
investigation is grounds for extension. The extension 
starts to run the day after the completion of the statute of 
limitations. The duration of the extension is the time that 
was needed to make a final infringement decision or the 
determination of the end of the investigation otherwise 
plus one year.71 
52.  The starting point of the limitation period for 
contribution claims is not covered by the Directive. 
Under Dutch law the starting point is the payment by 
one of the jointly and severally liable infringers of more 
than his share (as determined on the basis of Article 6:10, 
paragraph  1, and 6:102, paragraph  1, Civil Code).72 In 
this respect, it is, however, worth noting that contribution 
claims are governed by the law of the original damages 
claim. The statute of the latter will, therefore, also govern 
the issue of the statute of limitations of the contribution 
claims.
F. K.
VI. United Kingdom
53.  Limitation periods have in the past created some 
problems in the private enforcement of damages claims 
in the United Kingdom. In the past, stand-alone and 
follow-on actions could be initiated in the High Court, 
while only follow-on actions could be brought before the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In the High Court 
for England & Wales, the standard six-year limitation 
period of the Limitation Act 1980 applied to both stand-
alone and follow-on actions,73 while in the CAT, where 
only follow-on actions could be brought, the claim had to 
be made within a period of two years “beginning with the 
relevant date,” the relevant date being—cum grano salis—
when the infringement decision became final.74
54. This had the effect in Deutsche Bahn AG v. Morgan 
Advanced Materials plc that the claimants’ action against 
one of the addressees of a Commission infringement 
decision was struck out. The Commission decision, 
issued on 3  December 2003, had been addressed to 
seven defendants, including Morgan Crucible. All 
addressees except for Morgan Crucible (the immunity 
recipient) appealed to the General Court, and the 
General Court dismissed their appeals on 8 October 
2008. Deutsche Bahn brought a follow-on action in the 
71  Cf. Art.10, para. 4, Directive.
72 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court, 6 April 2012, NJ 2016/196, ASR / Achmea)
73 Limitation Act  1980, c. 58, whose s. 9(1) provides: “An action to recover any sum 
recoverable by virtue of  any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of  six years 
from the date on which the cause of  action accrued.” Even if  the nature of  the damages claim 
were to be seen in tort and not as a breach of  a statutory duty (as Garden Cottage Foods v. 
Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 141 held), and even if  a contract claim were brought, a 
six-year limitation period would apply (ss. 2, 5 Limitation Act 1980). At any rate, as will 
be discussed below, now paragraph  18(1) of  the new Schedule 8A to the Competition 
Act 1998 clarifies that the limitation period is six years.
74 Then: CAT Rules 2003, Rule 31.
CAT by claim form dated 15  December 2010 against 
six of the addressees (including Morgan Crucible, 
later renamed Morgan Advanced Materials). Morgan 
Crucible applied for the claim against it to be struck out. 
The CAT struck out the claim as being brought out of 
time, because the infringement decision against Morgan 
Crucible had become final once the time for appeal 
against the Commission decision had lapsed without 
an appeal being brought. Deutsche Bahn appealed, 
and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, arguing 
that the Commission’s infringement decision had not 
become final until the time for the further appeal against 
the General Court’s decision had lapsed; the Court of 
Appeal considered the Commission decision against 
all the various addressees as one unit, and this decision 
(addressed to various addressees) had not become final. 
The UK Supreme Court allowed the appeal against the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment.75 The “decision” in the 
meaning of s. 47A of the Competition Act 1998 was the 
decision addressed to Morgan, and since Morgan had not 
appealed the Commission decision, the decision against 
Morgan had become final on 13 February 2004, so that 
the two-year period under Rule  31 ended in February 
2006.
55.  Even before the implementation of the Damages 
Directive, the limitation periods in the High Court and 
the CAT were harmonised in the new s.  47E of the 
Competition Act 1998, inserted through paragraph 8(1) 
of Schedule 8 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which 
provides in s.  47E(2) that in England & Wales the 
Limitation Act 1980 will apply to the claim brought in 
follow-on actions in the CAT as well; in Scotland, s.  6 
of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 
applies; and in Northern Ireland, the Limitation 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1989 applies.
56.  In implementing the Damages Directive, the new 
Schedule 8A of the Competition Act 1998, inserted by 
the 2017 Regulations,76 provides in paragraph  17 that 
a competition claim may not be brought in England & 
Wales or Northern Ireland after the end of the six-year 
limitation period provided for in paragraph 18(1), and that 
in Scotland, proceedings may not be brought after the end 
of the prescription period (and the obligation in respect 
of the loss or damage is extinguished), this prescription 
period being five years under paragraph 18(2).
57.  Paragraph  19 of the new Schedule 8A to the 
Competition Act  1998 provides for the beginning 
of the limitation or prescription period, which is 
the later date of the day on which the infringement 
ceases or the “claimant’s day of knowledge,” defined in 
paragraph  19(2) as “the day on which the claimant first 
knows or could reasonably expected to know (a) of the 
infringer’s behaviour, (b) that the behaviour constitutes 
75 Deutsche Bahn AG v. Morgan Advanced Materials plc [2014] UKSC 24, [2014] Bus. L.R. 
377.
76 The Claims in respect of  Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements 
(Compeitition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017, 
Statutory Instrument 2017 No. 385, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/385/pdfs/
uksi_20170385_en.pdf. Ce
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an infringement of competition law, (c) that the claimant 
has suffered loss or damage arising from that infringement, 
and (d) the identity of the infringer.” According to 
paragraph  19(6), references to “a person knowing 
something” are to a “person having sufficient knowledge 
of it to bring competition proceedings.” Given that the 
beginning of the limitation period is delayed until the 
claimant’s day of knowledge, there is now likely little 
need for the provision in s.  32(1)(b) of the Limitation 
Act  1980, under which the beginning of the limitation 
period was delayed until concealment ended.
58. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 provide, respectively, that the 
periods of investigations by a competition authority, of 
a consensual dispute resolution process, and of collective 
proceedings are not to be counted when calculating 
the expiry of the limitation or prescription period. 
Paragraphs 20 and 24 provide for legal disabilities. 
59. The limitation period for claims for contribution in 
England & Wales is provided for in s. 10 of the Limitation 
Act 1980, and is set at two years, beginning from the date 
of the judgment, arbitral award, or the earlier of (1) the 
earliest date for which payment is agreed, or (2) on which 
payment is made.
F. W.-v. P. n
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